Abstract. A broadcast protocol allows a sender to distribute a message through a point-to-point network to a set of parties, such that (i) all parties receive the same message, even if the sender is corrupted, and (ii) this is the sender's message, if he is honest. Broadcast protocols satisfying these properties are known to exist if and only if t < n/3, where n denotes the total number of parties, and t denotes the maximal number of corruptions. When a setup allowing signatures is available to the parties, then such protocols exist even for t < n. Broadcast is the probably most fundamental primitive in distributed cryptography, and is used in almost any cryptographic (multi-party) protocol. However, a broadcast protocol "only" satisfying the above properties might be insecure when being used in the context of another protocol. In order to be safely usable within other protocols, a broadcast protocol must satisfy a simulation-based security notion, which is secure under composition. In this work, we show that most broadcast protocols in the literature do not satisfy a (natural) simulation-based security notion. We do not know of any broadcast protocol which could be securely invoked in a multi-party computation protocol in the secure-channels model. The problem is that existing protocols for broadcast do not preserve the secrecy of the message while being broadcasted, and in particular allow the adversary to corrupt the sender (and change the message), depending on the message being broadcasted. For example, when every party should broadcast a random bit, the adversary could corrupt those parties that want to broadcast 0, and make them broadcast 1. More concretely, we show that simulatable broadcast in a model with secure channels is possible if and only if t < n/3, respectively t ≤ n/2 when a signature setup is available. The positive results are proven by constructing secure broadcast protocols.
Introduction

Broadcast
Broadcast, as defined in the literature, allows a sender to securely distribute a message among a set of players, where security means that (i) all honest players eventually output the same message, no matter what the sender does (consistency), and (ii) this output is the sender's message, if he is honest (validity).
Broadcast was introduced by Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [PSL80] . The first efficient solution was given by Dolev and Strong [DS82] . Further research concentrated on lower bounds [FL82, FLM86] , efficiency [BGP89, CW92, BDDS92] , round complexities [MW88, FM89, GM98] , and feasibility with statistical security [BPW91, PW92, PW96] .
Broadcast is one of the most fundamental primitives in distributed cryptography. It is used in almost any task that involves multiple players, like, e.g., voting, bidding, secure function evaluation, threshold key generation, multi-party computation, etc -just to mention a few. The security of these protocols inherently relies on the security of the underlying broadcast protocol.
"normal" broadcast as sub-protocol, and the security analysis relies on the hope that this securely composes, which in general is not the case. 1 Recently, Lindell, Lysyanskaya, and Rabin [LLR02] have presented a broadcast protocol for t < n, which is concurrently composable when unique session IDs are available. This result does not contradict ours, as it is for the authenticated communication model only, where all messages sent through the network can be read by the adversary. In particular, even in the ideal world, the adversary can read the message that the sender sends to the broadcast functionality, and (by corrupting the sender) can also change it. Hence, also this protocol shows this unexpected phenomena that the adversary can decide to corrupt the sender and change the broadcast message after she has seen the broadcasted message, but this is allowed, as she could do so also in the ideal world. In particular, when this protocol would be executed in a model with secure channels, it would not remain secure.
Preliminaries
We consider the well-known secure channels model introduced in [BGW88, CCD88] : the players in P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } are connected by a complete network of bilateral secure channels. The communication is synchronous, i.e., all players have synchronized clocks and there is a known upper bound on the delivery time of any sent message. In such a synchronous model, the protocols proceed in rounds, where in each round several players might be instructed to send messages to several other players. All the messages sent in some round are delivered at the beginning of the next round.
The Adversary model
We consider a threshold adversary who can actively corrupt up to t players (we refer to this adversary as t-adversary). When some player p i is actively corrupted then the adversary has full control on p i . A player who is not corrupted is called uncorrupted or honest. Analogously, the corrupted players are also called dishonest.
Adaptive We consider an adaptive adversary. As opposed to a static adversary who chooses the players to corrupt at the beginning of the protocol, an adaptive adversary can corrupt additional players in the flow of the protocol depending on messages seen so far, with the only restriction that the total number of players she corrupts has to be at most t. As one would expect, an adaptive adversary is stronger than a static [CDD + 01]. Our results confirm this belief.
Rushing We consider a rushing adversary [Can00, Can03] . Intuitively, such an adversary is allowed to first receive all the messages sent to the corrupted players in a round, and then decide its strategy. A bit more formally, a rushing adversary can decide in each round the order in which the messages of this round are sent. When, in addition to being rushing, the adversary is also adaptive, then after each message which is sent, the adversary is allowed to corrupt more players depending on the messages she has seen so far. In particular, the adversary can, within some round, have an honest p i send a message to some corrupted p j , and depending on this message corrupt p i before he sends any further message. In this work, we consider an adversary who is both rushing and adaptive.
Composable Security
Following the [Can00, Can03] methodology security of protocols is argued via the ideal-world/real-world paradigm. In the real-world the players execute the protocol. The ideal-world is a specification of the task which we want the protocol to implement. More concretely, in the ideal-world the players can invoke a fully trusted party, called the functionality, denoted as F, in the following way: the player sends their input(s) to F; F runs its program on the received inputs (while running the program, F might receive additional inputs 1 The protocol in [Hev06] employs the verifiable secret-sharing scheme from [CDD + 99], which in turn employs some broadcast primitive which securely composes in the secure-channels model for t < n/2. So far, no such protocol is known. from the players or the adversary or send values to the adversary), and returns to the players their specified outputs. The specification of F is such that this ideal-evaluation captures, as good as possible, the goals of the designed protocol.
Intuitively, a protocol securely realizes a functionality F, when the adversary cannot achieve more in the protocol than what she could achieve in an ideal-evaluation of F. To formalize this statement, we assume an environment Z which decides the inputs of all players, and, at the end of the computation, gets to see their outputs. Z also sees the full view of the adversary A who is attacking the protocol. We denote the view of Z for an invocation of protocol π with adversary A as EXEC π,A,Z . A protocol π t-securely realizes functionality F when for any t-adversary A attacking protocol π, there exists an ideal-world adversary S (also called the simulator) such that no environment Z cannot tell whether it is interacting with A and the players running π or with S and the players running the ideal-world protocol (we denote the view of Z in an ideal-evaluation of F as EXEC F ,S,Z ).
The three typical security notions are: perfect security (A is computationally unbounded, and the random variables EXEC π,A,Z and EXEC F ,S,Z are identically distributed), statistical security (A is computationally unbounded, and EXEC π,A,Z and EXEC F ,S,Z are statistically close), and computational security (A is efficient, and EXEC π,A,Z and EXEC F ,S,Z are computationally indistinguishable)
The F-hybrid model The power of the simulation-based definition is that it allows to argue about security of protocols in a composable way. In particular, let π 1 be a protocol which securely realizes a functionality F 1 . If we can prove that π 2 securely realizes a functionality F 2 using ideal-calls to F 1 , then it follows automatically that the protocol which results by replacing, in π 2 , the calls to F 1 by invocations of π 1 also securely realizes F 2 . Therefore we only need to prove the security of π 2 in the so-called F 1 -hybrid model, where the players run π 2 and are allowed to make ideal-calls to F 1 . For more details on composability of protocols and a formal handling of both sequential and parallel composition (and also of universal composability), the reader is referred to [Can00, Can03] .
Perfect Security
In this section we consider the case of perfect security, i.e., information theoretic (i.t.) with no error probability. We show that perfectly secure broadcast tolerating a t-adversary is possible if and only if t < n/3. Although this bound already appears in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, none of suggested synchronous broadcast protocols for perfect security satisfies the simulation-based definition when securechannels and an adaptive adversary are considered. Also, in addition to handling the perfect security case, this section serves as a good way to introduce many of our ideas.
The ideal functionality for broadcast F BC when synchronous secure channels are assumed is quite intuitive; nevertheless, to keep our analysis complete, in the following we give a description. For simplicity we describe the functionality in terms of an ideal-world protocol. A UC version of this functionality can be found in the appendix.
Functionality F BC 1. p s sends his input x s to the Trusted Party (denoted as F BC ). 2. F BC sends x s to every p ∈ P.
To show that the above functionality is not realized by known protocols, we observe that these protocols follow the same paradigm: At the beginning of the protocol the sender p s sends his input x s to the players in P \ {p s }; in a second phase the players try to establish a consistent view on the sender's input. Clearly all protocols which start by the sender multisending his input and then invoke a consensus protocol on the received value, e.g., [BGP89, CW92, BDDS92] , are of the above type. However, even the protocols where the second phase is not a self-contained consensus protocol, e.g., the Dolev-Strong [DS82] or the PfitzmannWaidner [PW92] broadcast, also follow the above paradigm.
The fact that any protocol following the above paradigm is insecure against an adaptive adversary can be seen as follows: In any such protocol, because the adversary is rushing, she can corrupt the first player who receives the input x s from p s and depending on the received value decide whether or not to also corrupt the sender p s (and possibly change the broadcasted value). However, this behavior cannot be simulated, as by the time the simulator learns x s from the functionality it is already too late to change it (the functionality also sends it to all honest players).
A direct way to deal with the above problem is to make sure that before any player (or the adversary) learns any information on x s , the value x s is secret shared in a robustly reconstructible way. More concretely, when a secure Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme is given, then one can easily construct a secure broadcast protocol (i.e., a protocol realizing F BC ) by invoking the VSS protocol with dealer p s on input x s (where x s is reconstructed towards all players). Hence, in order to build a perfectly secure broadcast protocol it suffices to provide a perfectly secure VSS. 2 It might look that we are done, as one could use the perfectly secure VSS from [BGW88] to achieve broadcast (for a proof of security of this VSS scheme see [BGW88, Can00] ). But this is not quite true. The reason is that [BGW88] (and all other known VSS schemes with perfect security) use broadcast as a component. If we instantiate this component by one of the known broadcast protocols then we can no longer argue about the security of the full construction using composability. Nevertheless, we show in the following that replacing all broadcasting of values in the [BGW88] VSS scheme by invocations to the [BGP89] broadcast protocol 3 does not cause any loss of security; we shall denote this VSS scheme by VSS (BGP)
BGW . The security of VSS (BGP)
BGW is argued in two steps. In a first step, we show that although the [BGP89] broadcast protocol, denoted in the following as BC BGP , does not securely realize F BC , it does realize a weaker functionality, denoted as F UBC (we refer to this functionality as unfair broadcast). In a second step, we show that under certain conditions (which are satisfied by the [BGW88] VSS protocol) , we can replace F BC by F UBC without loosing security.
The functionality F UBC is described in the following. Intuitively, the difference to the functionality F BC is that F UBC allows the adversary to first receive the sender's p s input (even without corrupting p s ) and then, depending on the received value, decide whether or not she wants to corrupt p s and possibly modify the broadcasted value.
Functionality F UBC 1. p s sends his input x s to the Trusted Party (denoted as F UBC ). 2. F UBC sends x s to the adversary. 3. If p s is corrupted then the adversary sends a value to F UBC ; F UBC denotes the received value by x s (if p s is not corrupted then F UBC sets x s := x s ). 4. F UBC sends x s to every p ∈ P Lemma 1. Protocol BC BGP perfectly t-securely realizes the functionality F UBC for t < n/3. Proof. (sketch) As shown in [BGP89] , the protocol BC BGP satisfied the property-based definition of broadcast (i.e., it satisfies validity, consistency, and termination). We show that it perfectly securely realizes F UBC . Let A be an adversary attacking BC BGP ; a corresponding simulator S can be built as follows: First S waits for the input x s from F UBC . Note that, because BC BGP is fully deterministic and the players in P \ {p s } have no input, knowing x s allows S to perfectly simulate all the messages sent by honest players. 4 S invokes A and does the following:
1. S simulates all the players in the computation. 2. Whenever A requests to corrupt some p i ∈ P, S corrupts p i and sends (the simulated) internal state of p i to A. From that point on, S has (the simulated) p i follow A's instruction. 3. Whenever A sends a message to the environment Z, S forwards this message to Z. 4. At the end of the simulation, if some (simulated) uncorrupted player p i outputs x i = x s , then in the ideal evaluation p s sends x s to F UBC (even when he is corrupted). Otherwise, i.e., if x i = x s , S instructs p s to send x i to the functionality F UBC in
Step 3 (the correctness property of BC BGP implies x i = x s only when p s is actively corrupted.).
It is easy to verify that EXEC F UBC ,S,Z ≡ EXEC π,A,Z , i.e., the protocol perfectly securely realizes F UBC .
For the second step, we show that if a protocol has a special property, then it is safe to replace F BC by F UBC . The property is the following: For any value v which is supposed to be broadcasted, the adversary "knows v in advance", i.e., there exists a deterministic strategy for this adversary to compute v based on the contents of her view before the call to the broadcast primitive. We formalize this in the following lemma. Note that the lemma holds for any security level and is not restricted to perfect security. 5 Lemma 2. Let Π be an F BC -hybrid protocol which securely realizes a given functionality F, and let Π denote the protocol which results by replacing in Π all the calls to F BC with calls to F UBC . If Π uses calls to F BC only to broadcast values which the adversary knows in advance, then Π securely realizes F.
Proof. (sketch) Let A be an adversary attacking Π in the F UBC -hybrid model. We show how to construct an adversary A attacking Π in the F BC -hybrid model such that Exec Z,A ,Π ≡ Exec Z,A,Π . This is sufficient as then we can use the simulator for A (which is guaranteed to exist by the security of Π) as a simulator for A . A behaves exactly as A except in the invocations of F UBC : when F UBC is to be called, in order to simulate the first message of F UBC towards A (corresponding to the broadcasted value) A computes the value to be broadcasted (using the deterministic strategy on his view which is guaranteed to exist by the fact that she knows the broadcasted value in advance) 6 and sends this value to A . A is now allowed to corrupt the sender and (possibly) change the value he is supposed to broadcast. A acts accordingly and then invokes F BC . It is straightforward to verify that Exec Z,A ,Π ≡ Exec Z,A,Π .
We point out that the [BGW88] VSS protocol satisfies the pre-condition of Lemma 2. Indeed, the protocol uses broadcast only for the complaints and the accusations issued by players and for the dealer to reply to them. By careful inspection of the protocol one can verify that all these broadcasted values can be computed from the view of the adversary before they are broadcasted. Because this VSS is secure for t < n/3, combining Lemmas 1 and 2 we get the following corollary. Corollary 1. If t < n/3 then there exists a protocol which perfectly t-securely realizes the functionality F BC . Remark 1. Although replacing F BC by F UBC did not affect the security of [BGW88] VSS, this is not in general true for any protocol using broadcast. In fact, even when the broadcasted message is uniformly and independently chosen (intuitively this implies that the adversary gets not information by learning it) it is not 4 In fact, for any adversary A, S can generate exactly the same messages as the uncorrupted players would if the protocol would be run with this adversary. 5 However, for the case of computational security we will have to require that the strategy of the adversary to compute the value which is to be broadcasted is efficient. 6 Wlog we can assume that A forwards his entire view to A [Can00, Can01] .
always the case that we can do this replacement. For example, consider the protocol where each player p i in turns broadcasts a uniformly random bit and the output is the vector of the broadcasted bits. If broadcasting is done by F UBC then the adversary can corrupt the p i 's (up to t players in total) who are about to broadcast 0 and change the broadcasted value to 1. This will create a bias towards 1 in the output distribution, which cannot be simulated if F BC is used for broadcasting, as the bits are chosen randomly. Note that this is not a simultaneous-broadcast problem, as the we do not require that the adversary's decisions are independent of what the honest players broadcast.
To complete this section we show that t < n/3 is tight for perfectly secure broadcast. We use the following impossibility result from [LSP82, KY84, FLM86] (for a nice proof see also [Fit03] ).
Lemma 3 ([LSP82, KY84, FLM86, Fit03] ). If t ≥ n/3 then there exists no protocol which simultaneously satisfies correctness, consistency, and termination, even in the presence of a non-adaptive adversary.
The impossibility proof for the functionality F BC follows directly from the above lemma and the fact that any protocol securely realizing F BC has to satisfy the given three properties.
Corollary 2. If t ≥ n/3 then there exists no protocol which perfectly t-securely realizes the functionality F BC .
We point out that Lemma 3, hence also the impossibility for F BC , holds even for the cases of computational and statistical security when no setup is available. This implies the following:
Corollary 3. If t ≥ n/3 and no setup is available then there exists no protocol which computationally t-securely realizes the functionality F BC . The statement holds also for statistical security.
Statistical and Computational Security (with a trusted setup)
In this section we consider the cases of statistical security, i.e., information theoretic with negligible errorprobability, and computational security. For these security notions, it is widely believed that when a setup allowing digital signatures is assumed, then broadcast is possible for an arbitrary number of cheaters (i.e., t < n), e.g., by using the Dolev-Strong broadcast protocol [DS82] for computational security or using [PW92] for statistical security. We show that this folklore belief is wrong when an adaptive adversary is considered. We already argued in the previous section that the Dolev-Strong broadcast protocol is not adaptively secure. In this section we show that the condition t ≤ n/2 is necessary and sufficient for broadcast both for computational and statistical security.
We start by proving the sufficiency of the condition t ≤ n/2; this is done by providing a protocol which securely realizes F BC . We handle the two security notions, i.e., computational and statistical, in parallel. In our protocol, the players will need to digitally sign messages they send. This is modeled by assuming that the protocol has access to an ideal functionality for digital signatures F SIG (for definition and properties of such a functionality see [Can03] ).
The Broadcast Protocol
Our approach is analogous to the case of perfect security, namely we first show that there exists a secure realization of F UBC for t ≤ n/2, and then use Lemma 2 to derive a protocol for F BC from an F UBC -hybrid protocol. However, this last step is more involved than simply using a statistically secure VSS protocol satisfying the preconditions of Lemma 2. Indeed, all known protocols for statistical VSS are only secure for t < n/2 which is stronger than t ≤ n/2. Before describing how to overcome this difficulty we state the following lemma which will allow us to use Π DS as a secure realization of F UBC . The proof is along the lines of the proof of Lemma 1; the only difference is that the simulator needs also to simulate the digital signatures of honest players in a run of the protocol, which is guaranteed to be able to do by the definition of F SIG . 7 Lemma 4. Protocol Π DS perfectly t-securely realizes F UBC for t < n in the F SIG -hybrid model, where the signatures are replaced by calls to an ideal signature functionality F SIG .
To implement the second step, namely construct the F UBC -hybrid protocol, we use as starting point the VSS from [CDD + 99]. In [CDD + 99] IC-signatures are used to ensure that some p j who receives a value v from some p i can, at a later point, publicly prove that p i indeed send him v. Because IC-signatures are secure only when t < n/2, in this work we use digital signatures for the same purpose. The signatures are generated and verified by calls to the assumed digital signatures functionality F SIG . We point out that the signed message should include enough information to uniquely identify for which message in the flow of the protocol the signature was issued (e.g., a unique message ID associated with every message sent in the protocol). Depending on whether the calls to F SIG are instantiated by a computationally or an i.t. secure signature-scheme, our broadcast protocol will achieve computational, respectively i.t. security.
In the following, we first describe our sharing, which is along the lines of [CDD + 99], and specify some useful security properties, and then we describe and analyze our broadcast protocol.
Secret Sharing Following the terminology of [CDD + 99], we say that a vector
A value s is said to be d-shared among the players in P when every (honest) player p i ∈ P holds a degree-d polynomial g i (·) and for each p j ∈ P p i also holds p j 's signature on g i (j), where the following condition holds: there exists a degree-d polynomial q(·) with q(0) = s and g i (0) = q(i) for all p i . The polynomials g 1 (·), . . . , g n (·) along with the corresponding signatures constitute a d-sharing of s.
We describe the protocols HD-Share (the HD stands for Honest Dealer) and Reconstruct which allow for a dealer p D to d-share a value s, and for public reconstruction of a shared value, respectively.
The protocol HD-Share is along the lines of the sharing protocol from [CDD + 99]. We describe HD-Share (see next page) in the {F SIG , F BC }-hybrid model, i.e., HD-Share uses calls to F BC for broadcasting and calls to F SIG for signature generation and verification. To ensure that the output of HD-Share matches the form of our sharing, i.e., every honest p i holds a degree-d polynomial g i (·) and signatures from all other players, we do the following: for every message transmission, the receiver p j confirms when he receives a well-formed message from p i or, otherwise, p j complains and p i is expected to answer the complaint by broadcasting the message. If some p i is publicly caught to misbehave, e.g., by broadcasting a malformed message, then p i is disqualified. Because dishonest players cannot be forced to sign the messages they send, we make the following convention: when p i is disqualified, then every player takes a default value, denoted as ⊥, to be p i 's signature on any message (⊥ will always be accepted as valid signature of disqualified players on any message). The proof of the lemma is along the lines of the security analysis in [CDD + 99] and is, therefore, moved to the appendix. To reconstruct a sharing the protocol Reconstruct is invoked. The idea is the following: every p i announces his share and the corresponding signatures from the players in P; if some signature is invalid or the the announced share is not d-consistent, then p i is excluded from the reconstruction, otherwise his sharepolynomial is interpolated; The zero-coefficients of the share-polynomials of the players that have not been excluded are used to reconstruct the shared value. Depending on the actual choice of d the sharing might not uniquely define a value. In any case the players adopt the value which is output by the interpolation algorithm. The consistency of the output is guaranteed as it is decided on publicly seen values. (a) For j = 1, . . . , n : p i sends s i,j from some p j in Step 2 which is inconsistent with his own view of s i,j , i.e., s
i,j , and if so, broadcasts s
i,j and that the signatures are valid and if so p D is disqualified. a a The signature includes information to uniquely identify for which message in the flow of the protocol it was generated, e.g. a unique message ID, and also includes a unique session ID.
Protocol Reconstruct 1. Each p i ∈ P broadcasts (s i,1 , . . . , s i,n ) along with the corresponding signatures sig p 1 (s i,1 ) , . . . , sig pn (s i,n ); if any of the broadcasted signatures is invalid or if the broadcasted vector is not d-consistent, then p i is disqualified. Otherwise a polynomial g i (·) is defined by interpolating the components of the vector. 2. Let P"ok" = {p i 1 , . . . , p i } denote the set of non-disqualified players. The values g i 1 (0), . . . , g i (0) are used to interpolate a polynomial g (·) and every player outputs g (0).
Lemma 6. Protocol Reconstruct invoked to the {F BC , F SIG }-hybrid model outputs (the same) y ∈ F towards every player. Furthermore, if d < n − t (where t is the number of corrupted players) and the input is a d-consistent sharing of some s, then y = s.
We next describe our broadcast protocol for t ≤ n/2. The idea is to have the sender p s share his input x s by a degree-(t − 1) sharing using HD-Share with d = t − 1 and subsequently invoke Reconstruct on the output of HD-Share. The intuition is the following: When p s is honest until the end of HD-Share, then HD-Share outputs a (t − 1)-sharing of x s (Lemma 5: honest-dealer correctness); as t ≤ n/2 implies d = t − 1 < n − t, Lemma 6 guarantees that Reconstruct will output x s . Hence, the only way the adversary can change the output to some s = s is by corrupting p s during (or before) protocol HD-Share. As there are at most t corrupted players, if the adversary wishes to corrupt p s then she can corrupt at most t − 1 of the remaining players; as a (t − 1)-adversary gets no information on x s (Lemma 5: privacy), this decision, i.e., whether or not to corrupt p s , has to be taken independently of x s , which is a behavior that can be easily simulated.
As already mentioned, both HD-Share and Reconstruct use calls to F BC for broadcasting. In order to replace F BC by F UBC , we need to make sure that the precondition of Lemma 2 is satisfied (i.e., the adversary "knows in advance" all broadcasted values). For protocol HD-Share this is guaranteed by Lemma 5. However, the values which are broadcasted in Reconstruct are not necessarily known to the adversary in advance. We resolve this by a technical trick, namely we introduce a dummy step between HD-Share and Reconstruct where every player sends to every other player his output from protocol HD-Share. Observe that this modification might give an advantage to the adversary only when she has not corrupted p s by the end of HD-Share, as otherwise she knows all the outputs. But in this case at the end of HD-Share the output is already fixed to x s and even giving the adversary access to the full transcript does not allows her to change the output. For completeness we include a description of our broadcast protocol and state its achieved security. Due to space restrictions the formal security proof has been moved to the appendix.
Protocol Broadcast (p s , x s ) 1. Invoke HD-Share t−1 (p s , x s ); if p s is disqualified then every player outputs a default value, e.g., 0
and halts. 2. (dummy step) Every p i ∈ P sends his output from HD-Share to every p j ∈ P. 3. Invoke Reconstruct on the output of HD-Share.
Lemma 7. Protocol Broadcast perfectly t-securely realizes the functionality F BC in the {F UBC , F SIG }-hybrid model, for t ≤ n/2.
Combining the above lemma with Lemma 4 we get the following.
Corollary 4. If t ≤ n/2 and a statistically (resp. computationally) secure signature scheme is available then there exists a protocol which statistically (resp. computationally) t-securely realizes the functionality F BC .
To complete this section, we show that the condition t ≤ n/2 is necessary for adaptively secure synchronous broadcast both for i.t. and for computational security. The idea of the proof is the following: Because the adversary can corrupt half of the players in P \ {p s }, she can be the first to learn noticealbe information on the dealers input, before the honest players in P \ {p s } jointly learn noticable information. Depending on this information the adversary can corrupt the sender and, with overwhelming probability, change the output to some other value. However this behaviour cannot be simulated. A detailed proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 8. There exists no protocol which computationally t-securely realizes the functionality F BC for t > n/2. The statement holds also for statistical security.
Conclusions
We considered the problem of securely realizing broadcast in the secure-channels model. In this model, it has been shown that there exist protocols satisfying the property-based definition of broadcast and tolerating a t-adversary, if and only if t < n/3 when perfect security is considered. For unconditional and computational security, when a setup allowing digital signatures is given, the corresponding bound is t < n.
We showed that, when a rushing and adaptive adversary is considered, known broadcast protocols do not realize the natural ideal functionality for broadcast in the secure-channels model. As a result, if one replaces the broadcast invocations in any of the known muli-party protocols for the secure-channels model, e.g., [BGW88, RB89, CDD + 99], by one of the known broadcast protocols, the security of the resulting protocol cannot be argued using the composition theorems.
We described protocols which securely realize the (natural) ideal functionality for broadcast for each of the three security notions. For the case of perfect security, we showed that the tight bound matches the corresponding bound for the property-based definition, i.e., t < n/3. However, for the cases of statistical and computational security (with setup assumptions) the necessary and sufficient bound is t ≤ n/2. announce the correct values, hence the correct polynomials are interpolated. Because there are at least d + 1 honest players there will always be at least d + 1 values to interpolate the correct g (·) and recover the shared value.
Proof. (sketch) By inspection of the protocol on can verify that the preconditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied for every value which is broadcasted. Therefore we can use F UBC for broadcasting values. The security of our protocol is argued as follows: First observe that in any point of the protocol, if the simulator S learns x s , then for any strategy of the adversary A, S can perfectly simulate all the remaining values in the transcript, namely the values which should still appear in the view of A and the values appearing in the view of honest players. 8 We consider three cases: Case 1. The sender p s is correct until the end of (the simulated) HD-Share: as soon as (the simulation of) HD-Share is complete, the simulator allows p s to give his input to F BC , receives x s as his output and uses it to simulate the full transcript. Case 2. The adversary corrupts p s in (the simulated) HD-Share (this implies that at most t − 1 players in P \ {p s } can be corrupted): the simulator does not invoke F BC yet, but learns x s from the adversary; this way S can simulate the full transcript; denote by y the output of some (simulated) honest player; S instructs p s to send y to the F BC in the ideal evaluation. Case 3. The adversary corrupts t of the players in P \ {p s } during (the simulated) HD-Share: For as long as at most t − 1 players are corrupted, Lemma 5 ensures that the simulator can perfectly simulate without knowledge of x s . At the point when the adversary requests to corrupt the t-th player, the simulator knows that the output of Broadcast will be x s (since A can no loger corrupt p s ); S allows p s to give his input to F BC , and, as in Case 1, S receives x s and can now simulate the full transcript.
Proof. To arrive at a contradiction, assume that there exists a computationally (resp. statistically) t-secure SFE protocol Π. Wlog, assume that p s uses Π to broadcast a uniformly random x s . For every round i, protocol Π implicitly assigns to every set P ⊆ P a probability Pr P ,xs,Π,i , which is the probability of the best efficient adversary corrupting P to output x s based only on her view on Π up to round i. For all P ⊆ P \ {p s } this probability is negligible if i is the first round of Π and overwhelming if i is the last round of Π. As the total number of rounds in Π is polynomial, for each P ⊆ P \ {p s } there exists a round i P where this probability from negligible becomes noticeable, i.e., not negligible. The adversary corrupts the set A ⊆ P \ {p s } with |A| = t − 1 such that i A = min{i P | P ⊆ P ∧ |P | ≤ t − 1}. In round i A , the adversary gets the values which are sent to corrupted players and runs the best (efficient) protocol for the players in A to compute x s ; denote be x the ouput of this protocol (by our assumption, x = x s with noticeable probability). Let F 1/2 denote the set of first |F|/2 (in any ordering) elements in F. If x ∈ F 1/2 then the adversary acts as a passive adversary (i.e., all corrupted players are instructed to correctly execute their protocol). Otherwise, i.e., if x ∈ F \ F 1/2 , then the adversary actively corrupts p s and forces all the actively corrupted players to crash before sending any message in round i; as |P \ A| ≤ t − 1, with overwhelming probability the output of the honest players will be in F \ {x}. With this strategy the adversary achieves that when x ∈ F \ F 1/2 the output of Π is different than x s with noticeable probability. However the simulator cannot simulate this behaviour as he has to decide whether or not to corrupt p s independent of p s 's input.
